- Two-thirds of the new 210-seat People’s Assembly will be chosen by electoral colleges, with the remaining third appointed directly by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa.
- The vote excludes several minority and contested regions, features muted campaigning, and critics warn it favours centralisation over genuine political pluralism.
On 5 October 2025, Syria held its first parliamentary vote since the fall of the Assad regime—but in a form hardly recognisable as democratic. The process is indirect, tightly controlled, and offers limited avenues for genuine citizen participation, prompting concern from civil society groups and observers across the Arab world.
The structure: electoral colleges and presidential appointments
Under the new rules, roughly 6,000 electors (selected by local committees) cast ballots to choose 140 deputies, representing two-thirds of the 210 seats in the People’s Assembly. The remaining 70 seats will be filled by direct appointment of President Ahmed al-Sharaa.
The election law grants the assembly a 30-month term (renewable once) and tasks it with powers such as approving budgets, ratifying treaties, and issuing general amnesties. Proponents argue the hybrid model is a pragmatic compromise in a country beset by displacement, lack of reliable population registers, and security challenges.
But the authorities deferred polling in key provinces — notably Raqqa, Hasakah and Suwayda — citing ongoing tensions and local opposition to central control. This means 19 parliamentary seats will remain vacant. All candidates formally run as independents, since existing parties were dissolved after Assad’s fall and no framework for new parties has been fully established.
Limited visibility, limited participation
In Damascus and other major cities, public campaigning was virtually invisible: no posters, public rallies, or open party debates could be seen. Many residents say they did not even know an election was imminent.
Local civil society organisations proposed deploying independent observers, but the election commission declined. Instead, monitoring is nominally assigned to the Syrian Bar Association. Electoral committees also introduced last-minute roster changes in some districts, complicating transparency.
Women and minority representation remain fragile. While certain districts field higher percentages of female candidates, others have extremely low participation. No formal quotas are mandated. Some analysts fear the president’s appointees will primarily consist of loyalists, tipping the legislature’s balance decisively in favour of the executive.
Critiques and risks for legitimacy
More than a dozen non-governmental organisations released a joint statement claiming the design allows al-Sharaa “to effectively shape a parliamentary majority composed of individuals he selected or ensured loyalty from,” thereby undermining pluralism. Critics argue that without direct popular voting or robust oversight of elector selection, the process lacks meaningful accountability.
Given the exclusion of entire provinces and the absence of a popular vote, large segments of Syria’s population—particularly displaced persons and communities in contested areas—will lack representation.
While the transitional order presents this as a temporary compromise, the potential for consolidation of power is stark. If the appointed and elected deputies act as a single bloc aligned with the presidency, the new parliament risks becoming a rubber stamp rather than a forum for accountability.
A truly legitimate legislative authority would require expanding geographic inclusion, ensuring gender and minority quotas, allowing independent oversight, and ultimately holding genuine popular elections. Absent these steps, this first post-Assad parliament may be more a façade than a meaningful democratic institution.
