• Taliban militants opened fire on multiple Pakistani border posts, reigniting tensions along the disputed frontier. Pakistan says it was forced to retaliate after sustained attacks originating from Afghan territory.
• Pakistan, after supporting Afghanistan through two major wars and hosting millions of refugees, now faces mounting economic, social and security fallout.
Late on the night of 11-12 October 2025, Taliban and India-sponsored Fitna-al-Khawarij forces opened heavy fire on Pakistani military posts along the Durand Line, triggering some of the most intense border clashes in recent months. The exchange occurred across several sectors of Kurram, Bajaur and Mohmand, where Pakistani outposts came under simultaneous attack using light and heavy weapons.
According to the Pakistan Army, Afghan forces had positioned tanks and heavy artillery in nearby areas before the assault, signalling a calculated escalation. The Pakistani military denounced what it described as “the cowardly action” aimed at destabilising the border and providing cover for terrorist infiltration.
In a statement issued by Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), Pakistan said its troops “exercising the right of self-defence, repelled the assault decisively”. The statement added that “last night’s episode vindicates Pakistan’s long-standing position that the Taliban government is actively facilitating the terrorists”.
As of Sunday 12th October, ISPR confirmed that 23 Pakistani troops had been martyred and at least 29 were injured during the confrontation, though officials said the coordinated response prevented heavier losses. They added that “more than 200 Taliban and affiliated terrorists have been neutralised, while the number of injured is much higher”. The army reported that its retaliatory strikes destroyed multiple Taliban positions and training camps used for planning attacks on Pakistani soil. Military sources said more than twenty enemy outposts were temporarily captured before Pakistani troops withdrew after neutralising the threat.
By morning, the main fighting had subsided, though residents in Kurram district reported hearing intermittent gunfire and shelling. ISPR stated that they ensured “all possible measures were taken to avoid collateral damage and to protect civilian lives”. Civilian movement across the Torkhan and Chaman border crossings was suspended, leaving traders and travellers stranded as both sides reinforced their positions.
Afghan officials claimed the latest clashes were a response to Pakistani air operations earlier in the week. Islamabad, however, maintains that those strikes targeted Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants based inside Afghanistan who have carried out multiple terrorist attacks in Pakistan, including the 30 September suicide bombing in Quetta that struck a paramilitary base, killing 10 people. From Islamabad’s standpoint, Afghanistan was the aggressor, allowing militants to launch attacks from its soil and then portraying Pakistan’s defensive response as unprovoked.
The tensions also follow a surge in anti-Pakistan sentiment inside Afghanistan. In September 2025, street rallies were held in Kabul and several other cities accusing Pakistan of interference and destabilisation. The protests, reported by Al Jazeera, reflect a broader political effort to redirect internal discontent outward. Far from being spontaneous, the demonstrations appear state-driven, aimed at uniting a fractured population behind a nationalist cause while diverting attention from Afghanistan’s worsening economy and internal divisions.
By amplifying anti-Pakistan rhetoric, the Taliban regime portrays itself as a guardian of Afghan sovereignty even as it struggles to govern effectively at home. Analysts quoted by Al Jazeera described these tensions as “politically useful to the Taliban”, noting that anti-Pakistan sentiment often surges when domestic criticism rises.
For Pakistan, such demonstrations are further evidence of a deliberate effort by Afghanistan to inflame public opinion against its neighbour and divert attention from its own internal challenges. The violence has once again highlighted the fragile nature of relations between the two countries.
Meanwhile, trade through key border crossings remains suspended and diplomatic channels are tense. Pakistan’s Foreign Office reiterated that the country “reserves the right to respond decisively to any provocation” and urged Afghanistan to prevent its soil from being used for terrorism against Pakistan.
The escalation also coincided with Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s week long visit to India, Pakistan’s principal regional rival – an outreach that drew notice given the timing and Afghanistan’s strained relations with Pakistan.
Background and Context
Even though Pakistan has long acted as a supportive neighbour – sheltering millions of Afghans and advocating regional stability – hostilities persist, fuelled largely by deep-seated Afghan resentment over the Durand Line. This colonial-era boundary, drawn in 1893 between British India and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, remains the internationally recognised frontier separating the two states.
When Pakistan gained independence in 1947, it inherited the line under the principle of uti possidetis juris, meaning newly formed states retain their predecessor’s borders. Yet despite this continuity, successive Afghan governments have refused to accept the Durand Line as a permanent demarcation, turning it into the symbolic core of their dispute with Pakistan.
Modern legal scholars affirm that treaties containing mutual commitments, even those predating independence, retain binding force through continued recognition and state practice. As Professor Jan Klabbers notes, “insofar as an instrument contains commitments, it is to be treated as a treaty and performed in good faith”. Pakistan’s uninterrupted control and border enforcement for more than seven decades confirm its legitimacy in both law and practice.
Afghanistan continues to claim the line was imposed or temporary, yet no international body has recognised that position, nor has it sought arbitration. Dawn observed that “successive Afghan rulers have not given up their irredentist claims … on this they have always received support from countries hostile to Pakistan”. In Afghan political rhetoric, the Durand Line is often framed as a colonial wound but in reality it is a legally binding boundary recognised internationally and reinforced through state practice.
International and Pakistani data indicate that, as of October 2024, Pakistan hosted around 1.5 million Afghan refugees and asylum-seekers, plus over 1.5 million Afghans of other legal statuses (e.g. undocumented or semi-documented) within its borders. Academic sources note that Pakistan “ranks third highest refugee hosting country worldwide”. While Afghanistan and some media occasionally cite “4 million Afghans in Pakistan”, much of that likely consists of individuals without formal registration or documentation.
Without valid identification such as a CNIC, passport or Afghan Citizen Card, undocumented Afghans are excluded from most formal services. They are not registered with the UNHCR, so Pakistan receives no international funding for millions of these residents. UN aid covers only registered refugees, typically financing housing, health care, education and camp infrastructure. As a result, the full burden of undocumented Afghans falls entirely on Pakistan’s own system where provincial governments bear costs for hospitals, schools, utilities and security without external support.
Public hospitals absorb the cost of treatment, schools accommodate Afghan children without international subsidies and local authorities maintain roads, sanitation and electricity grids serving both citizens and refugees. Meanwhile, the Interior Ministry and law enforcement agencies face higher security and surveillance expenses due to untraceable populations. The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and municipal bodies report mounting losses from illegal utility use, while the education and health budgets in affected provinces continue to stretch beyond capacity.
This population also strains the job market, housing and public services, particularly in Karachi, Quetta and Peshawar where majority of Afghans live. Working mostly in the informal sector, many pay no taxes yet there is an increased demand for food, fuel and housing. The result is higher inflation, reduced wage growth and persistent fiscal pressure on local administrations already managing energy theft, smuggling and policing challenges.
For Islamabad, undocumented populations are no longer just a humanitarian concern but also now represent a combined economic and national security liability – one that drains resources and undermines stability despite Pakistan’s decades of humanitarian accommodation.
Beyond the humanitarian load of hosting millions of Afghans, Pakistan also faces severe financial losses through the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA). The agreement allows Afghanistan, as a landlocked country, to import goods through Pakistan’s ports duty-free, on the condition that the shipments go directly into Afghanistan. In practice, however, much of that cargo returns through informal routes, bypassing taxes.
Untaxed goods, like electronics, tyres, textiles, cigarettes, saturate Pakistani markets and undercut lawful traders who pay import duties. The Federal Board of Revenue estimates that this smuggling network costs Pakistan over U.S. $3 billion annually. Meanwhile, Afghanistan and the Taliban regime profit by collecting informal levies on these routes, turning Pakistan into the economic casualty of its neighbour’s trade loopholes.
Pakistan’s record of support stretches back decades. During the Soviet invasion (1979-1989), it became the frontline state for Afghan resistance, hosting three to four million refugees and facilitating international aid. Later, in the US-led war (2001-2021), Pakistan again aligned with global peace efforts. The Ministry of Finance estimates over USD 150 billion in cumulative economic losses from terrorism, disrupted trade and rising defence spending.
The rupee’s fall demonstrates the significant impact on its economy. In 2001, one British pound equalled PKR 67; today it trades around PKR 375. Decades of conflict and instability have left the economy battered. More than 83,000 Pakistanis, including soldiers, police, civilians and aid workers, have been killed in terrorism linked to the Afghan conflict.
For over four decades, Pakistan has been Afghanistan’s lifeline – offering refuge, shelter, trade routes, education, medical care and humanitarian assistance while bearing the heaviest costs. Yet it has also borne the consequences: terrorism, smuggling, inflation and reputational strain. Pakistan now insists that the borders be respected, undocumented residents must regularise or repatriate, and Afghanistan must share responsibility for regional stability. Recent aggressions, however, indicate that Islamabad’s call for cooperation may continue to be met with resistance, prolonging a cycle of hostility that benefits neither nation nor the wider region.
